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Functional Attributions and Functional 
Architecture
A Reply to Axel Kohler
Michael L. Anderson
In his commentary (Kohler this collection) on my target article (Anderson this
collection), Axel Kohler suggests that componential mechanism (Craver 2008) in
fact  suffices  as a framework  for  understanding function-structure  relationships,
even in complex cases such as direction selectivity in Starburst Amacrine Cells.
Here I’ll argue that while Kohler is correct that the framework can accommodate
such cases, this approach misses an opportunity to draw important distinctions
between what appear to be different sorts of relationships between functioning
systems and the mechanisms in virtue of which they function. I tentatively suggest
further that the avenue that one prefers may turn on whether one expects the
functional architecture of the brain to be primarily componential and hierarchical
(Craver 2008; this collection) or typically more complex than that (Pessoa 2014). 
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1 Introduction
In my target article (Anderson this collection), I
argued  that  the  complexity  of  the  function-
structure relationships that give rise to direction
selectivity in Direction-Selective Ganglion Cells
Direction-Selective Ganglion Cells (DSGCs) and
in  the  dendrites  of  Starburst  Amacrine  Cells
Starburst  Amacrine  Cells  (SACs)  represent  a
challenge  to  componential  mechanism  as  cur-
rently formulated (Craver 2008). First, I argued
that distinguishing between the system S that
exhibits  the  target  phenomenon  ,  and  theψ
mechanism M in virtue of which it s allowsψ
one to paint a more nuanced picture of the vari-
ous ways entities can be organized so as to give
rise  to  observed function.  Second,  I  suggested
that  the  function-structure  relationships  in
these  particular  cases  appeared to violate  the
bottom-up hierarchical assumptions at the cen-
ter of the componential mechanistic framework,
which requires that the components of M in vir-
tue of which a system exhibits  are at a lowerψ
level of organization than S. In the cases under
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discussion,  I  argued  that  some  parts  of  the
mechanism in  virtue  of  which  SAC dendrites
function  are  at  a  higher level  of  organization
than the dendrite, and that parts of the mech-
anism in virtue of which DSGCs function are at
the  same level.  Moreover,  I  noted  that  in
neither of these cases were all the entities that
constituted M constitutive parts (components)
of S. 
To accommodate such cases, I recommen-
ded extending the notion of mechanistic consti-
tution with the notion of an enabling constraint:
mechanisms, we should say, enable function in
systems by changing the relative probabilities of
functional outcomes of activity in S. I suggested
that this change would allow us to more accur-
ately characterize the variety of structure–func-
tion  relationships  in  the  brain  (and  in  other
complex systems). However, in his commentary
on  my  article  (Kohler this collection),  Axel
Kohler argues that such an extension is unne-
cessary,  for  in  fact  the componential  mechan-
istic framework of Craver and Bechtel (Craver
2008; Craver & Bechtel 2007) can accommodate
these cases. 
Kohler is correct. The extension is strictly
speaking unnecessary, and componential mech-
anistic explanation can offer one plausible char-
acterization  of  function-structure  relationships
in these cases. In fact, it is probably the case
that  no example or set of examples  ever forces
one  to  give  up on an  explanatory framework
(certainly not one as well-motivated and useful
as  componential  mechanism).  What  examples
such as these can do, however, is illuminate the
potential  advantages of a new approach, and I
would like to use the opportunity offered by this
reply to reiterate what I take some of those ad-
vantages to be. 
2 Three possible system-mechanism 
relationships 
In my target article (Anderson this collection) I
suggested that once one distinguishes between
the system S that s and the mechanism M inψ
virtue of which it does so, it is easy to see that
there are three possible relationships between M
and S. First, the components of M can all also
be components of S, such that M is a relevant
sub-component of S. Let’s call this relationship
R1. A relationship of type R1 obtains between
the drive-train of an automobile and the auto-
mobile as a whole. Second, (R2), M and S can
be identical. I can’t think of an uncontroversial
example of this relationship, and imagine that
such a case is relatively rare. Third and finally,
(R3), M and S can cross-cut in various ways,
sharing some but not all of their parts. In my
view, for instance, it is the neuron the fires an
action potential, but not all of the entities that
comprise  the mechanism for  generating action
potentials are also part of the neuron. For ex-
ample,  the ions in the extracellular fluid that
are crucial for establishing the membrane poten-
tial are not part of the neuron, although they
are clearly part of the mechanism. Similarly, I
argued in my target article that in the case of
direction-selectivity in SAC dendrites, although
it is the dendrite itself that is directionally se-
lective, many of the parts of the relevant mech-
anism  are  not  in  fact  parts  of  the  dendrite.
Moreover, in the case of DSGCs, the cell and
the mechanism in virtue of which it is direction-
selective share at  most  one part:  the synapse
between the SAC dendrite and the DSGC. 
One  advantage  of  making  these  distinc-
tions, I believe, is that it allows one to see quite
clearly when top-down constraints are respons-
ible for function, as I argued is the case for dir-
ection selectivity in SAC dendrites. But Kohler
suggests  that  appearances  may  be  misleading
here. In fact, he argues, we should “reconstitute
the phenomenon” by recognizing that the relev-
ant  direction-selective  system is  not  the  SAC
dendrite, but is rather the dendrite + the non-
dendritic elements of the mechanism, including
other SACs. This larger system can be then be
treated within the standard framework of com-
ponential mechanism. We can call this approach
to addressing these sorts of cases “the Kohler
strategy”.
As I noted in my target article, the Kohler
strategy is certainly open to the mechanist. It
does, however, have the following effects. First,
it  tends to make the systems of  the brain to
which functions are attributed relatively  larger
and more diffuse, which arguably reduces preci-
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sion. Second, it would in effect turn all apparent
instances of R3 into instances of R2.1 I noted
above that I thought the class of R2 would be
small. If I am right about the prevalence of R3
functional relationships in the brain, then this
strategy  would  make  R2  very  large.  But  it
would do so essentially by legislation, as a way
of preserving the universal applicability of the
componential mechanist framework. How forced
this appears will depend on how closely one be-
lieves  the  guiding  assumptions  of  that  frame-
work match the architectural facts of the brain.
We will return to this last point after reviewing
some of the considerations that appear to favor
the Kohler strategy. 
3 Motivations for the Kohler strategy
Kohler maintains that actual scientific practice in
fact supports the Kohler strategy. Exhibit A in
his argument is a recent article (Kim et al. 2014)
detailing part of the mechanism for visual motion
detection.  Kohler  reproduces  a  figure  depicting
their model, and argues that the inclusion of the
distributed network in the model suggests that
the authors are strictly speaking attributing func-
tion to the whole system as depicted:
Although  it  is  true  that  investigators
sometimes refer  loosely to local  elements
as displaying a certain characteristic, the
corresponding  detailed  and  extended  ac-
counts of  direction selectivity give credit
to the distributed nature of  the relevant
systems  that  figure  in  explanations.
(Kohler this collection, p. 6)
I agree that this is one possible interpretation of
the practice. But here is another: these scient-
ists are distinguishing between the system that
exhibits  the  phenomenon  and  the  mechanism
that produces it, and are open to different sorts
1 Actually, there are some questions here, for there seem to be obvious
instances of R3 with which the mechanist is and should be entirely
comfortable, e.g., the neuron and the mechanism of the action poten-
tial. So presumably this strategy would be employed only when the
relationship appeared to violate the “lower-level entity” constraint.
I’ve not the space to pursue this further here, so will note only that
selectively pursuing the Kohler strategy would need separate justific-
ation. 
of relationships between them. Consider the fol-
lowing from the paper Kohler discusses:
Research on [the visual detection of motion]
has  converged  upon  the  SAC.  An  SAC
dendrite is more strongly activated by mo-
tion outward from the cell body to the tip
of the dendrite, than by motion in the op-
posite direction. Therefore an SAC dendrite
exhibits DS, and outward motion is said to
be its ‘preferred direction’. Note that it is in-
correct to assign a single such direction to a
SAC, because  each  of  the cell’s  dendrites
has its own preferred direction. DS persists
after blocking inhibitory synaptic transmis-
sion,  when  the  only  remaining  inputs  to
SACs are BCs, which are excitatory. As the
SAC exhibits DS but its BC inputs exhibit
little or none,  DS appears to emerge from
the BC–SAC circuit.  (Kim et al. 2014, p.
331; emphases added)
Far from seeming loose, the attribution of direc-
tion-selectivity  to  the  dendrite  appears  to  me
clear and precise. Moreover, note that in the final
sentence quoted above, the attribution of direc-
tion-selectivity to the cell is reinforced, even in
the context of a reference to the mechanism as
the “BC-SAC circuit”. Indeed, I would argue it is
natural and permissible to gloss the last clause in
the following way: “DS in the dendrite appears to
emerge from the BC-SAC circuit.” On this read-
ing, of course, the authors of this article would be
proposing an R3 functional relationship such that
parts of the mechanism are on a higher level of
organization than the system exhibiting the phe-
nomenon. 
That these authors are open to R3 rela-
tionships  of  various  sorts  appears  to  be  rein-
forced by a line later in the paper: 
Previous  research  suggests  that  On–Off
direction-selective  ganglion  cells  inherit
their  DS  from  SAC  inputs  owing  to  a
strong violation of Peters’ rule. (Kim et al.
2014, p. 335; emphasis added)
Here again we see the same pattern: a clear at-
tribution of direction-selectivity to the DSGC in
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the same sentence as a reference to the distal
mechanism (the SACs), in the context of what
is obviously an R3 relationship between system
and mechanism. Thus,  while  I  agree that  the
Kohler strategy is viable, I don’t see that con-
sideration of scientific practice forces us to ad-
opt it, or even necessarily favors it. 
So what might be other reasons for adopt-
ing the Kohler strategy over extending mechanism
to include enabling constraints? As I mentioned
at the end of  the previous section, the matter
might come down to how closely one thinks the
architectural  facts  about  the  brain  match  the
guiding assumptions of the componential mechan-
ist framework. If one expects that the brain is at
root a decomposable or nearly-decomposable sys-
tem of well-defined interacting components, then
componential mechanism does indeed seem like a
very appropriate framework for capturing at least
the majority of its functional relationships (with
the few exceptions to be dealt with perhaps as
secondary elaborations or special cases). If, how-
ever, one takes seriously the notion that the brain
is a massive network marked by multiple, nested,
cross-cutting,  dynamic hierarchies interacting in
bottom-up, top-down, feed-forward and feedback
fashions (Pessoa 2014), then one might wish for
some of the explanatory flexibility that the notion
of  enabling  constraints  appears  to  offer.  I,  of
course, am in this latter camp (Anderson 2015). 
4 Conclusion
As Kohler correctly points out, it is possible to
accommodate these complex cases of function-
structure relationships within the componential
mechanistic  framework,  by  reconstituting  the
phenomenon  and  ascribing  function  to  the
whole mechanism that produces it. I have tried
to indicate what I think some of the costs are to
the Kohler strategy, including an apparent con-
flation  of  R2  and  R3  functional  relationships
and a potential loss of grain in our ascriptions
of function to structure. For some, paying these
costs will be preferable to the proposed altern-
ative, which might appear to require the admis-
sion of spooky top-down causes into our onto-
logy.
For  those  who instead want to maintain
the greater attributional specificity that appears
to  conform to  scientific  discourse,  and in  the
current case to explain direction selectivity  in
the SAC dendrite, then I would argue that the
most  promising  strategy  is  to  recognize  the
ways in which functional parts (including net-
works)  can  impose  constraints  on  other  func-
tional parts, at whatever relative level of organ-
ization. Adopting this strategy will of course fo-
cus attention on the nature of these constraints,
whether bottom-up, top-down, or synpedionic. I
would hope that the careful study of such R3
relationships as those showcased here would res-
ult in a better understanding of the varieties of
causal interactions in complex systems.
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